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Abstract
This paper shows that when ﬁrms consider quality as a long run choice variable, a
preferential free trade arrangement can create a quality gap in favor of its member countries,
as long as R&D spillovers are not perfect, and increases welfare of member countries. This
result implies that a preferential free trade arrangement such as a free trade area or a customs
union can bring an exclusive long run beneﬁt to the member countries.
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I. Introduction
In recent years many trade agreements have been approved by the WTO.
1 These
liberalization arrangements have received the attention of numerous economists, in particular,
those working in international economics. Both the theoretical and empirical literature have
been mainly focused on the e#ects of these agreements on national welfare.
2 The literature is
mainly silent on the e#ect of such arrangements on product quality which is important from
both positive and normative analysis. This paper addresses the issue of the impact of regional
agreements on product quality. It is argued that a regional trade agreement may be used as a
long-run strategy by a member country to realize gains from trade in high quality products.
The trade literature that analyses the relationship between increasing trade and product
quality is mainly concerned with the short-run e#ect.
3 In this paper product quality is
analyzed as a long-run variable.
4 We consider a model in which two exporters compete in an
1 According to the WTO o$cial website, 117 regional trade agreements have been approved and in e#ect since
1995. The total numbers would be 168 if we include the numbers from the GATT system starting 1948.
2 For the complete literature review on regionalism, see Panagariya (1999).
3 Papers include Corden (1974), Rodriguez (1979), Santoni and Van Cott (1980), Falvey (1979), Aw and
Roberts (1986), Das and Donnenfeld (1987, 1989), Krishna (1987), Bond (1988), Donnenfeld (1988), Feenstra
(1988), Boorstein and Feenstra (1991) and Ries (1993).
4 Industrial economists have taken this view for long time. For example, see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1980,
1986), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984), Ronnen (1991), Sutton (1992), Motta (1993) and Aoki and Prussa
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics 47 (2006), pp.197-217.  Hitotsubashi Universityimport market. It is then established that the member of a free trade agreement (FTA) may
produce a higher quality product than the non-FTA member. We believe that this result
emerges from being an insider than an outsider in our framework.
This result is somewhat similar to Herguera et al. (2002) who also treat quality as a
long-run variable. They show that a domestic ﬁrm (i.e. insider) always produces a high quality
good when the domestic country sets its optimal tari# against a foreign ﬁrm. Unlike their
model, however, we introduce a preferential tari# system and consider the insider as a foreign
trading partner of the system. Furthermore, we assume that an R&D investment of a ﬁrm has
a positive spillover e#ect on the other’s product quality level. We show that the quality gap
between an FTA and non-FTA members would be reduced (or disappear) when the spillover
becomes stronger (or perfect).
Furthermore we show that, given the FTA system and an imperfect spillover of R&D, as
the quality gap is larger (so that the FTA-member exporter supplies a better quality product
than the non-FTA exporter), the importing country would prefer importing more from its
member exporter. The government, then, would optimize its welfare by setting a higher
external tari# against the non-FTA exporter.
5 This results in a greater trade diversion toward
the FTA-member exporter. Nonetheless, compared to the case without the FTA system, we
ﬁnd that a formation of an FTA yields a higher welfare to the importing country of the FTA
because its domestic consumers consume higher quality products as a result of the FTA
formation.
Note that, under the FTA system, the FTA member exporter facing a zero tari# becomes
a high R&D investor, while the non-FTA member exporter facing a positive tari# becomes a
low R&D investor. This is in line with Saggi (2004)’s recent ﬁnding for discriminatory tari#
system:
6 a higher tari# will be imposed on low cost producers relative to high cost ones. In our
model, however, ﬁrms are symmetric in production costs and we allow for the ﬁrms to choose
R&D investment before the production stage. It turns out that the FTA member exporter
spends more costs on R&D than the non-FTA member exporter.
To ﬁx the idea of the results, we use a three-country model of trade. Two countries
produce di#erentiated products under a duopolistic structure and the third country imports
the products. It is assumed that the ﬁrm’s optimal choice of R&D investment and thus quality
level is undertaken before producing the di#erentiated products. The importing country sets
tari# barriers against each of the duopolists under the two distinct trade regimes —w ith and
without a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with one of the exporting countries. The two
ﬁrms compete each other through quantities. This is a simple model for analyzing quality and
welfare changes but the results are quite robust. First, our results hold in a case of price
competition between the ﬁrms. Second, even in a case when the two ﬁrms face a domestic
competition in the importing market, the results still hold qualitatively. We did not include
(1997). In their models, ﬁrms invest in quality before they produce goods and thus quality costs are sunk in the
market competition stage. In international context, see Herguera et al. (2000, 2002) and Zhou et al. (2002).
5 In the literature of preferential free trade analysis, it is known that optimal tari# rates against non-FTA
members are decreased as well. This e#ect is well documented in a various model and termed as ‘a tari#
complementarity e#ect’ in the literature. For instance, see Bagwell and Staiger (1997) and Bond, Riezman and
Syropoulos (forthcoming). In our model, we ﬁnd that the e#ect becomes weaker as the quality gap is larger.
6 Note that, while Saggi (2004) considers Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause as an alternative to the discrimina-
tory tari# system, we do not. We simply compare a trade regime with and without an FTA formation.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +32these modiﬁcations in the paper since no additional or interesting ﬁndings were obtained.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic model with an optimal
trade regime with and without an FTA and compare the results. Section III summarizes the
paper.
II. The Model and Results
Consider a simple three-country model, one large importing country denoted by l and two
exporting countries denoted by 1 and 2. We assume that the importing country has a








The variables x1 and x2 represent the quantities of each variety imported from 1 and 2
respectively. Similarly, the variables q1 and q2 show the quality of each variety 1 and 2
respectively. The term z denotes expenditure on numeraires (zmpixipjxj with m as
incomes) and the parameter q is an index of the degree of horizontal product di#erentiation.
As it approaches 0, the goods become independent, while as it increases, the products become
more substitutable. In particular, as the parameter approaches 2, the goods become perfect
substitutes. For reasons of simplicity, we will assume 0q2.
Note that the utility function speciﬁed in equation (1) is commonly used to analyze in a
partial equilibrium that focuses on a particular industrial structure (e.g., a di#erentiated
product market as in this paper). The partial equilibrium analysis ignores the income e#ects on
the particular industry. That is, even when there is a change in income level of each consumer,
it does not a#ect the consumer’s consumption choice for the products of the industry. As we
will see later in this section, the government’s tari# revenues are a part of the government’s
objective functions and will be redistributed to the consumers as a part of income. The new
income generated that comes from the redistribution of tari# revenues will be spent on the
numeraires z and will increase the consumer’s utility level eventually.
Given equation (1), the inverse demand function for variety i(j){1, 2} is;
piqi2xiqxj.( 2 )
Note that the intercept is increasing in quality variable, which implies a rightward shift of
demand in a case of quality improvement.
The duopoly game in the importing market is as follows. At stage 1, the foreign ﬁrms
simultaneously choose their qualities. The quality level will be determined by R&D investment
choice. Note that, following Motta (1992), we assume a spillover e#ect between the ﬁrms’ R
&D investment. At stage 2, the government of the importing country determines the level of
optimal tari#s for countries 1 and 2. In this stage, we consider separately two di#erent trade
regimes; no free trade system versus a bilateral free trade agreement with one of the exporting
countries. In this sense, a trade regime is exogenously given. Later we will consider an









2q(x1x2/q1q2)z as in Sutton (1997, 1998) and Symeonidis (1999, 2000).
EG:;:G:CI>6A I6G>;; EDA>8N, EGD9J8I FJ6A>IN 6C9 L:A;6G: 2006] +33alternative game where a trade regime is endogenously chosen by the importing government.
At stage 3, the two ﬁrms export the products to the importing market. The problem is solved
by backward induction.
Stage 3: Cournot solution In each of the two exporting countries, there is only one ﬁrm
that supplies one variety to the importing country. The cost of production is denoted by c for
each of the ﬁrms. An assumption of c1 is necessary to ensure the existence of a meaningful
solution. We assume that the cost of production is industry-speciﬁc, so the two ﬁrms face the
same cost of production. For simplicity, we assume c0. When ﬁrm i sells variety i to a
consumer of the importing country, it pays a speciﬁc tari# ti to the country and earns the
market price pi per unit. The proﬁt of each ﬁrm is;
pi(pti)xi, i{1, 2}. (3)
In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium













where N indicates a trade regime without an FTA.
The optimal quantity of each product is determined by quality choices and tari# rates.
First, as a quality of a product improves or as the tari# rate declines the optimal quantity of
the export increases. This is because the consumer in importing country likes a high-quality










0. Second, as the
competing product’s quality declines or as the importing country raises tari# rate against the
competing product the optimal quantity of the export increases. This is because the consumer












Suppose that the importing country at stage 2 proposed country 2 an FTA and country 2
accepted it, without a loss of generality.
9 Given the FTA with country 2 (t20), the optimal























where F indicates a trade regime with an FTA.
8 Bertrand competition does not qualitatively alter our main result, the e#ect of preferential tari# policy on
quality gap.
9 Due to the symmetry of the model, the results should be the same for a case when the importing country
proposed country 1 an FTA and country 1 accepted it.




















0f o ri{1, 2} and ij. When the tari#sa r e
exogenously given, the partial impact of quality change on product quantities is the same





















partial impact of tari# t1 (the external tari# against non-FTA member-country 1 if the trade
regime is F) on product quantities is also identical before and after the FTA formation since










can not be obtained because the tari#
rate for the FTA member (country 2) is ﬁxed at zero.
The optimal quality levels and the optimal tari# rates will be determined by the exporting
ﬁrms in stage 1 and by the importing country in stage 2 respectively. Next we solve the optimal
tari# choices under the two di#erent trade regimes, given the level of quality chosen by the
ﬁrms in stage 1.
Stage 2: Tari# setting Consider government l choosing tari#s to maximize its national
welfare under two di#erent trade regimes: optimal tari# system and a bilateral free trade















The consumer’s surplus is deﬁned as an aggregated sum of the consumer’s marginal utility
level above the expenditure in markets. It measures the degree of the consumer’s satisfaction
after payments have been made. The tari# revenues are the government’s revenues from
imports and are redistributed to the consumer in a lump-sum manner, which also increase the
consumer’s utility level. So, a maximization of the national welfare is tantamount to maximiz-
ing consumer’ utility.
































 also holds with q(0, 2). By using (4) and
rearranging the ﬁrst order condition in terms of tari#s ti for i{1, 2} and ij, we can obtain




















0. This implies that the importing country improves the welfare level by
changing the tari#s in the same direction. More speciﬁcally, suppose that the importing
country reduces a tari# for country 2 (maybe due to a free trade agreement). Then the price
of the good imported from country 2 becomes lower and the consumption of the good becomes
EG:;:G:CI>6A I6G>;; EDA>8N, EGD9J8I FJ6A>IN 6C9 L:A;6G: 2006] ,*+larger. Given a certain degree of substitutability between the two competing products, the
other good’s demand (i.e. product 1 imported from country 1) will be reduced and thus the
importing government su#ers welfare loss from reduced consumer’s surplus. To prevent any
further welfare loss in the other good’s market, the government will reduce the tari# so that
the price becomes lower. So, it can increase its welfare by reducing the tari# for country 1 as
well.
Under the optimal tari# system, the national welfare maximization problem yields the










When a quality of a product is increased, an optimal tari# rate will be raised by the
importing country. First, a higher quality product attracts more consumption and thus more
imports. Given the larger amounts of imports, the importing government further increases its






0f o ri{1, 2}. Second, if the other product, say, product 2 improves its quality, the consumer
will consume less of product 1, which will reduce national welfare in the market of product 1.
To reduce the loss of national welfare the importing government increases the tari# rate so that






i{1, 2} and ij.
Note that the optimal tari# rates are not MFN-based since the two optimal tari#sm a y
di#er if the two ﬁrms choose di#erent quality levels.
10 However, since the two countries are
symmetric under no-trade agreement, the quality level chosen by each of the countries will be
the same and thus the optimal tari#s level will be equalized. We will compare these (non-MFN
but symmetrical) optimal tari#s with those under a bilateral free trade agreement. Note that
our paper focuses on trade-regime analysis for no-FTA versus an FTA, but not for an MFN
versus an FTA. We leave this important topic, MFN, for our future research.
Under the bilateral free trade system with country 2 (t20), the welfare maximization
























0 for all q(0, 2). Note that the quality levels chosen
under the FTA regime are di#erent from those under no-FTA regime. We are going to solve
the quality levels under the di#erent trade regime at stage 1 and see that an FTA can generate
a quality gap between an FTA member exporting ﬁrm and a non-FTA member ﬁrm.
More interestingly when we compare (11) and (12), we ﬁnd that the external tari#
10 The MFN tari#s can be obtained if we set titjt and maximize the national welfare. After some calcula-
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so-called tari# complementarity e#ect of FTA. In fact, this e#ect has been well-documented in
the existing trade theory literature, in particular, regional trade agreement literature. For
example, see Bagwell and Staiger (1997). Our paper will investigate how this will be a#ected
by a spillover e#ect of R&D between the competing ﬁrms.
Stage 1: Product R&D and Quality choice Consider the functional relationship between
R&D investments, denoted by R, and quality levels; qi1Ri+Rj for i{1, 2} and ij.T h e
constant term, 1 means that there is a minimum level of quality regardless of R&D. The term
+ shows a degree of technological spillover, +[0, 1]. When it is zero, there is no spillover
between the R&D investment, while when it is one, it implies a perfect spillover. The cost of
R&D is assumed to be R
2/2.
Using the solutions for exports and tari#s at stage 2 and 3, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization
problem is formulated as follows. For i, j{1, 2} and ij;
max
Ri
pi(xi(qi, qj, ti(qi, qj), tj(qi, qj)))(Ri)
2/2 s.t. qi1Ri+Rj. (13)























The second order condition holds for +[0, 1] and q(0, 2). The response function can
be obtained from the ﬁrst order condition. The solution for optimal R&D can be obtained by
the two response functions of Riri(Rj)f o ri, j{1, 2} and ij. By totally di#erentiating the











































i (qi, qj), t
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j (qi, qj)). So the e#ect of Ri on x
N





























t200 in (9), t1 should be smaller when t20i sg i v e n .











































































Note that qi and qj a#ect x
N




j . All signs in A and






+ for i{1, 2} and ij.A sf o rA, ﬁrst,
when the ﬁrm decides to increase its R&D, it will increase the quality of the product by
(qi
(Ri
1. This has a direct positive impact on the optimal quantity of exports that the ﬁrm can











. However, given the rise in imports, the






















0i n( 4 )

 
. The increased quality of the product will
also motivate the importing government to protect the market against the competing ﬁrm











. This will even










0i n( 4 )

 
.A sf o rB, when the ﬁrm decides




1. This is because of the R&D spillover e#ect between the two ﬁrms. The higher quality of the












consumer will buy more of the higher quality product. There is also indirect negative e#ect:
The higher quality of the competing ﬁrm’s product will give a reason for the importing








0i n( 1 1 )

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and thus the imports










0i n( 4 )

 
. However, as the quality of the
competing ﬁrm’s product is improved, the government can further maximize the national








































q2)). So the e#ect of R&D on the optimal quantities are;







































































































































First, comparing with A and B in (17) the second (negative) terms in A and B are removed for
FTA member (i.e. country 2). Second, the third (positive) terms in A and B are removed for
non-FTA member (i.e. country 1). So, it is likely that the impact of quality improvement on




















from (11) and (12), the ﬁnal e#ect on FTA member and







for both trade regimes. (Proofs of Lemmas will be delegated to the
Appendix.)






under the two di#erent trade regimes as follows. For q















































































































From lemma 1(i), we learn that a rise in R&D expenditure of a ﬁrm will eventually
increase export performances in any trade regime but the relative impact will be larger to the
FTA-member exporting ﬁrm and smaller to the no-FTA exporting ﬁrm, compared to the case
of no-FTA regime. Intuitively, by engaging an FTA the exporting ﬁrm can e#ectively remove























in A and B in (17) because of t20. So, the ﬁrm within the FTA can export more from the R
&D expenditure. However, if the ﬁrm is outside the FTA, the positive channel on the export






















0 are disappeared in A and B in (17)
because of t20.
Interestingly, lemma 1(ii) tells that, although the ranking of
(xi
(Rj












eventually determine the sign of
dRi
dRj
in (16). With lemma 1, we are ready to characterize the
R&D response functions from (14). We summarize them in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Response functions satisfying (14) are all linear and their slopes are as follows. (Refer
to Figure 3 for four cases.)
(i) If 0+ 4q
24q

































































































First, consider the trade regime without an FTA formation. Suppose that a response
function described in lemma 2 is sloping downward. In other words, when the R&D of a ﬁrm
increases the other ﬁrm reduces its R&D level. This may happen because the rise of R&D of
the ﬁrm can e#ectively reduce the other ﬁrm’s export. The main reason why the other ﬁrm’s
export can be reduced is because of a weak spillover e#ect of R&D between the two ﬁrms. As
the spillover e#ect gets weaker, the positive channel of R&D expenditure on other ﬁrm’s
product quality becomes less e#ective. (Refer to (17).) As shown in lemma 2, this downward








Likewise, the fact that a response function is positively sloped implies a positive response of a
ﬁrm’s R&D to the other ﬁrm’s increased R&D level. The rise in R&D of a ﬁrm can increase
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,*0the other ﬁrm’s export through the stronger spillover e#ect of the R&D on the other ﬁrm’s
quality of the exports. From lemma 2, this upward sloping R&D response functions are










However, the thresholds of + at which the slope of response functions turns positive are















case (ii) in lemma 2), when non-FTA ﬁrm increases its R&D expenditure, the FTA exporting
ﬁrm also does so. This is because one of the negative channel through which the exports may
be reduced is eliminated due to the formation of the FTA. To see the eliminated channel,











. This means that when the FTA ﬁrm increases its R&D
expenditure, the non-FTA ﬁrm will increases its R&D only when the spillover e#ects between
them are su$ciently high (i.e. in case (iv) in lemma 2). This is because one of the positive
channel through which the exports may be increased is eliminated due to the formation of the
FTA. Again to see the eliminated channel, compare B and B2 for veriﬁcation.
Now we need to show an existence of solution from the response functions. We
summarize the results in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique solution from the R&D response functions for each of the four
cases in lemma 2.
With lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we provide our ﬁrst proposition as follows.
Proposition 1 Under the FTA regime, the exporting ﬁrm in the FTA region invests on R&D more





Proof. First, under the no FTA regime, since the ﬁrms are symmetric, the choices of the
optimal R&D expenditure are identical. This implies that the two ﬁrms’ response functions
cross at a point on the 45-degree line. Now when the importing country and the exporting
country (i.e. country 2) formed an FTA, we need to show that the response functions cross at
a point below 45-degree line. In doing so, we use the values of intercepts found in the proof in
lemma 3. The results are summarized in Figure 3 in the Appendix for each case. For the case
of 0+ 4q
24q








20. So the FTA










1	R20 and the non-FTA
ﬁrm’s response function shifts downward. Although the slope of FTA ﬁrm’s response function
turns positive, the solution exists from lemma 3. For the case of
3q
8









20 based on lemma 3 and thus the response functions with
positive slopes are all shifted to the right. For all cases, a crossing point of the two response
functions under the FTA regime must be located in the area below 45-degree line. 
EG:;:G:CI>6A I6G>;; EDA>8N, EGD9J8I FJ6A>IN 6C9 L:A;6G: 2006] ,*1Note that if the spillover e#ect between the two ﬁrms is perfect (+1), the resulting levels
of product quality would be the same regardless of any chosen optimal level of R&D
investments of the two ﬁrms. In our model, the FTA member exporter chooses a higher level
of R&D than the non-FTA member exporter because the FTA member saves the tari# costs
and can a#ord more R&D. Nevertheless, when the spillover is perfect (+1), the beneﬁt of R
&D is perfectly transmitted to each other’s product quality. So, there would be no gap in
qualities between FTA and non-FTA members. The quality gap will exist only when the
spillover e#ect is not perfect. Here we provide our second results when an imperfect spillover
e#ect is assumed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that there is an imperfect spillover e#ect of R&D investments between the
two exporting ﬁrms (0+1). (i) The FTA formation results in a quality gap in favor of
the FTA member’s product. (ii) As the technology spillover becomes smaller (larger) the




1) becomes larger (smaller)( iii) As














1 due to the symmetry of the model.













































. To show if this is the case or not, due to the




1 and +, we rely on a simulation with




1 over +(0, 1) in Figure 1.




1 and the x-horizontal line is for +.)












1 and +, we rely on a simulation with numerical values of parameters. Using q


















0 with q1a n d+(0, 1)
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,*2Assuming that the imperfect spillover e#ect is getting weaker, proposition 2 tells that an
FTA may bring a higher quality product from its FTA member country and that the importing
government becomes relatively more protective against non-FTA country. In other words, the
importing country diverts the trade more toward the FTA member by setting a higher external
tari# against non-FTA member country.
A trade diversion (toward a high cost country) usually reduces a welfare of the importing
country. However, in our model, we assume that the two ﬁrms are identical in production
costs. So, the trade diversion does not necessarily bring expensive products to the importing
market. Instead, in our model, the FTA member’s exporting ﬁrm invests more on R&D and
exports a higher-quality product than the non-FTA member. The product quality improve-
ment will shift the demand curve to the right (see the inverse demand function in (2)) and thus
will increase the size of the welfare gain to the consumers in the market. So if a reduction of
tari# revenue as a result of FTA formation is not signiﬁcant, the welfare level of the importing
country with the FTA can be higher than the level without the FTA mainly due to the quality
improvement. Here we summarize this interesting case in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The welfare level of the importing country can be increased as a result of the FTA
formation if the welfare beneﬁt from a higher quality of products imported cancels out the
reductions of tari# revenues.
The optimal tari#s in (11) are the welfare-maximizing ones, so any other tari#s should not
be able to increase the welfare of the importing country mainly because of the reduced tari#
revenues. So, given any level of quality of products imported, an FTA formation should not
contribute to the welfare improvement. However, in our model, the quality level of products
are determined after the choice of a trade regime. So, it is possible for the importing country
to increase its welfare if the welfare beneﬁt from a higher quality of products imported cancels
out the reductions of tari# revenues.
So far we treated the FTA formation as a given trade regime between an importing
country and one of the exporting countries and thus the FTA formation came before quality
choice of the exporting ﬁrms. However, since the FTA formation is also a tari# policy just as








0 with q1a n d+(0, 1)
EG:;:G:CI>6A I6G>;; EDA>8N, EGD9J8I FJ6A>IN 6C9 L:A;6G: 2006] ,*3the government’s decision as to whether or not to sign an FTA.
12
Our deﬁnition for the long-run quality variable was meant to take into account a ﬁrm’s
long-term view on the quality of product which will be chosen before its production choice.
Here, we extend the view to consider a truly long-run case where the quality choice comes even
before the importing government’s decision on an FTA formation. The timing of this
alternative game is as follows.
At stage 1, the two ﬁrms simultaneous invest on quality-enhancing R&D. At stage 2, the
government l decides whether (i) to propose country 1 to sign an FTA, (ii) to propose country
2 to sign an FTA, or (iii) never to propose any country to sign an FTA. At stage 3, the
proposed government, if any, responds as to whether or not to sign an FTA with country l.A t
stage 4, the government sets optimal tari#s under a chosen trade regime. At stage 5, the two
ﬁrms competes in the importing country.
One di#erence between this new game and the old one is that, stage 2 and 3 here are
inserted after exporting ﬁrms’ quality choice and before importing government’s tari# choices.
In this new game, does the importing government at stage 2 choose to form an FTA in the
subgame perfect equilibrium? We doubt it does, mainly because R&D investments are going to
be committed at stage 1 in this “truly” long-run model. To simplify the analysis, we modify the
model slightly as follows. Let us suppose that a ﬁrm in each country at stage 1 has two choices
of R&D; a quality-enhancing R&D, R
H or a minimum-quality R&D, R
L.I fR
H is chosen by an
exporting ﬁrm (or both) before an FTA o#er, the government l at stage 2 would not need to
o#er an FTA to the country (or both) because the quality of products will have been already
enhanced by the time of an FTA o#er. If the minimum quality-induced R&D, R
L is chosen at
stage 1, the government l also need not to o#er an FTA since it only reduces the tari# revenues.
Therefore, at stage 2, government l would not propose any country to sign an FTA. So at stage
1, both ﬁrms would choose, R
L, which is less costly in this simple model. Here we summarise
the result as follows.
Corollary 2 In the truly long-run game, no exporting ﬁrms would improve the quality of products
ex-ante and thus no competition for an FTA occurs. In this case, the importing government
would not o#er any FTA to an exporting country.
The above setting is rather speciﬁc as we consider only two options, high and low levels
of R&D. So, this result should not be interpreted as general one showing ‘zero-incentive’ for
R&D activities at all. In a more general setting, ﬁrms are still expected to engage in some R&
D. What this corollary tells about is that, the level of R&D of a ﬁrm may be ‘lower’ in a truly
long run than that in the case where an importing country is surely expected to o#er an FTA
to the ﬁrm.
This corollary seems interesting since it o#ers an idea of how exporting ﬁrms’ choice of
quality a#ects a future FTA formation. According to corollary 2, there is no e#ect of quality
choice on the FTA formation. However this does not necessarily mean that ﬁrms would never
improve quality of product when its government plans to form FTAs with other countries. As
we have seen in the previous game, when a ﬁrm is sure about the formation of an FTA (i.e. an
FTA is given), the ﬁrm will choose the quality-enhanced R&D. So, this suggests that there
12 I thank a referee to point this out and to suggest an alternative game (as described here) so as to investigate
and compare the results under the two games. The result under the alternative game is being presented here.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H ,+*would be a certain link between a probability of an FTA formation and ﬁrm’s quality choice.
The higher the probability of an FTA formation is, the more a ﬁrm invests on R&D activities
and thus the higher quality of products will be provided to the FTA region. What might a#ect
the probability of an FTA formation? One possible answer might be a ﬁrm’s lobby activity,
which persuades its government to pre-commit for an FTA formation. This could be an
interesting idea and we leave this for a future research topic.
III. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we treated product quality as a long-run variable and analyzed the e#ect of
a preferential trade agreement on the quality gap between the FTA member and non-member.
The main result is that, as long as the technology spillover e#ects are not perfect, the bilateral
free trade agreement has a stronger e#ect on the member country’s product quality improve-
ment than that of the non-member country. In a preferential free trade system, its member
countries’ ﬁrms could save their trade costs relatively more than non-members could. So, the
member ﬁrms can invest the increased proﬁts in R&D so that their product quality can be
higher than non-member’s. However, the quality gap would disappear if the technology
spillover e#ects are perfect, regardless of the trade regime. In addition, we saw that the FTA
formation could be beneﬁcial to the importing country through imported product quality
improvement. This result implies that an FTA may have a positive long term e#ect on its
member country. Therefore, a membership in an FTA can be viewed as a long-run strategy for
a country.
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A2: Proof of Lemma 2 The linearity of the response functions can be straightforwardly
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(0, 1).
A3: Proof of Lemma 3 Since the absolute value of the slopes of the response functions are all
less than 1, a solution, if any, should be stable and not diverge. So we only need to observe
where the intercepts of the response functions are. (i) First, suppose that there is no FTA
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i Rj0. Due to the symmetry of the ﬁrms, there must
be only one solution for R&D choice for each of the two cases. (ii) Second, suppose that there
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2(R1) is the value of R
F
2 when R10. From the ﬁrst order condition in (14) with t20, the








































2(R1) is the value of R1 when R
F
20. Using the same ﬁrst order condition, the
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. So from lemma
2, we can verify that if 0+ 4q
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2R10. (iv) To prove the existence of a unique solution under the FTA trade
regime, we compare the intercepts of FTA member’s and non-FTA member’s response
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